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Michael Tooley has argued that personhood can be properly 
ascribed only when an identifiable individual possesses: 1) the capabil-
ity of desiring to live ; 2) the concept of self as a continuing subject of 
experiences and other mental states; and 3) the belief that it itself is 
such a continuing entity.l This theory of personhood is of interest 
because it not only grants moral permissibility to abortion, but also 
permits certain forms of infanticide. 2 Strict application of this theory 
could give justification to the direct, intentional, free, voluntary, posi-
tive and knowledgeable killing of the insane, comatose and amnesiac. 
In these cases, the ascription of personhood would not be permissible 
because a concept of a continually existing self would be absent. And 
even further, if Tooley is to be believed, it may be permissible to 
ascribe personhood to some of the higher forms of animal life on the 
grounds that they may possess the capabilit ies, concepts and beliefs 
mentioned above . Because this theory purports to grant the freedoms 
and protections of the right to life to many individuals who are not 
members of the species homo sapiens, while at the same time impos-
ing many duties and obligations of members of that species, it deserves 
rather careful examination and attention. 
1. At the outset, it must be noted that Tooley does not establish 
any standards or criteria for determining the presence of the previ-
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ously mentioned desires, beliefs and capabilities. Procedures are not 
set forth for determining when it is the case that members and non-
members of the species homo sapiens possess these traits.3 This is a 
rather serious deficiency because the absence of these procedures 
makes it impossible to know to whom moral duties and obligations are 
to be ascribed. It is also impossible to know what are the obligations 
and duties of members of the species homo sapiens. If individuals who 
cannot express syntactically and propositionally the content of their 
mental states are going to be candidates for admission into the class of 
persons, then criteria for determining the presence of the required 
mental states must be established for fair judgments to be made. 
Tooley did not consider the development of these procedures suffi-
ciently important to be included in his work. And no developments of 
these methods have been made by him in later works, which may 
indicate the impossibility of establishing such procedures. 
2. The entailments and implications of the right to life are not 
clearly understood by Tooley either.4 The right to life grants security 
and protection to those who refrain from direct, free, positive, inten-
tional, proximate, voluntary and knowledgeable attacks on other valid 
claimants of the right to life.5 Persons and human beings are properly 
entitled to this right because they can freely choose to comply with its 
duties and obligations. But individuals who cannot choose to refrain 
from these direct, intentional, free, voluntary, positive and knowledge-
able attacks cannot be considered as valid claimants of the right to 
life. Tooley correctlY criticizes views of the right to life which only 
entail protection of the physical life of the individual. But the right to 
life does not offer protection to this dimension of life alone. The right 
to life is properly attributed to materially identifiable individuals 
who possess the capability of asserting into publicly observable exist-
ence higher orders of meaning, moral value and logic in a knowledge-
able and voluntary manner. The right to life protects the capability of 
these individuals to continue the actualization of these states. A neces-
sary means for such actualization is the physical existence and func-
tioning of the individual. The right to life does not merely protect the 
physical existence of the individual, for this is of no great moral 
significance in and of itself without a direct relation to the states and 
actions of the person. Rather, the right to life protects not only the 
physical existence but also the structures and functions of the person's 
states of mind. This means that actions which impair the operations of 
the person are as impermissible as are those which impair the physical 
existence of the person. Not only are abortion, murder and active 
euthanasia prohibited by this principle, but also actions and pro-
cedures which impair the functionings of the person, unless they are 
necessitated by other therapeutic procedures. Thus psycho-surgery or 
other procedures which destroy the capability of the human subject to 
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perform certain types of human action are prohibited. It is not mor-
ally permissible to act on a human subject in a manner that would 
destroy the capability for expressing intentions, forming conceptual 
thoughts, or using speech, for instance. 
3. Tooley mistakenly grounds the right to life on the desire 
of the individual for continued existence. Tooley's discussion fo-
cuses attention on the notion that the right to life is grounded 
on the desire for continued existence, and that the frustration 
of this desire is wrong.6 It is not clear why there is a moral evil 
involved in the failure to satisfy this desire. Desire itself is of 
no relevant moral value, even if it is a desire for life itself. And this 
desire is not directly and causally responsible for the assertion into 
publicly observable existence of any higher moral orders. It is not 
clear how the right to life is to be logically derived from the existence 
of this desire in a subject. For it seems that a right which is absolute 
and unconditional should be grounded on a more substantial basis. 
The proper grounds for entitlement to the right to life should not be 
an emotive or psychological state, but a state of being and should be 
based on the worth and ontological condition of the claimant. But 
granting the protections of the right to life on the basis of possessed 
psychological or emotive states grounds the right to life on unstable 
positivist and voluntarist grounds. 
other Basis for Right to Life 
Tooley's other basis for the right to life is the self-consciousness of 
the individual and the individual's awareness of the relationship be-
tween the self and the external states of affairs.7 It must be asked if 
there is any moral value or good attached necessarily to the awareness 
of this relationship or state of self-consciousness. It is not clear that 
either of these psychological states is directly and immediately respon-
sible for the existence of morally valuable states of affairs. An indi-
vidual 's awareness of a causal relationship between an ego and certain 
states of affairs is of no moral interest and is only of interest if the 
individual possessing it is of a certain moral worth. For if an individual 
possesses a certain worth, then these states of self-consciousness or 
awareness acquire merit and value . But if the individual is not one of 
significant worth, then these are of no value. 
Tooley's problem is that he grounds the right to life on the value or 
merit of the individual, but not on the worth of the individual. For 
Tooley, the individual has to achieve a certain status, such as being the 
causal agent of certain specific types of publicly observable events in a 
direct and immediate fashion, before he can validly claim the right to 
life. Thus, this right is grounded on the acquisition of certain capabil-
ities , beliefs or dispositions which are not considered meritorious. 
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Merits or values cannot stand as the grounds for the possession of 
rights, but only for privileges. The right to life is an absolute and 
inviolable one which requires a foundation that is stable and not sub-
ject to voluntary abolition. Self-consciousness and one 's awareness of 
the relationship of the ego to other states of affairs can be voluntarily 
abolished from existence in Tooley's scheme, and so destroy the 
grounds for valid entitlement to the right to life. 
Tooley 's self-consciousness requirement is ambiguous and incon-
sistently applied.8 He does not wish to deny the protections of the 
right to life to the comatose, sleeping, drugged or insane, but a strict 
application of the principle of self-consciousness makes conferral of 
the right to life difficult in these cases. When in these states, these 
individuals lack a concept of a self as causally related to human mental 
states. They are not the conscious and knowledgeable subjects of the 
desire to continue existing in these states. But Tooley wants to pro-
vide them with the protections of the right to life on the principle that 
they will soon come into full and proper possession of the states 
required for valid possession of the right to life. The logical structure 
of this theory would compel the disinterested analyst to ascribe the 
protections of the right to life to the infant who also will come into 
full possession of the states that are required for proper possession of 
the right to life. Tooley, however, refuses to do this, and this remains 
a conflict which he does not adequately resolve. 
Tooley is not specific in what is entailed in and implied by the 
self-consciousness principle. It is not clear if the ability to articulate 
and assert into publicly observable existence in a knowledgeable man-
ner that a self exists is what is entailed by this principle. It may be the 
case that self-consciousness only refers to an awareness of external 
forces operating in a causal relationship to one's existence. If the 
former is what is entailed by the self-consciousness principle, then it is 
doubtful that even fairly mature infants could be legitimately granted 
the tight to life. But if the latter is what is entailed, then unborn 
human life could be granted the protections of the right to life on 
account of the fact that this awareness seems to be present at the 
moment of genetic coding. If Tooley is to assert that self-conscious-
ness is necessary for the proper ascription of the right to life, then 
clarification of the content of self-consciousness should be provided. 
4. It is claimed by Tooley that there is no reason to attach any 
moral significance to differences in species, and that there is no reason 
to limit the class of persons to the class of human beings.9 With the 
last part of this statement, I can agree, but not with the first because it 
fails to see that some species lack the organic, morphological and 
neurological facilities which permit the persons' states of mind to be 
asserted into publicly observable existence. If the states of mind that 
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are proper to persons are to be properly possessed, then the physical 
capabilities permitting the assertion into existence of these states in a 
publicly observable manner must be present. Given our present knowl-
edge of the universe, the only species which retains the organic, mor-
phological and neurological structures permitting the mental states of 
persons to be asserted into concrete and public existence is the species 
of homo sapiens. If other species should be discovered to be in posses-
sion of these structures, then serious consideration would have to be 
given to admitting these species into the class of persons. Possession of 
these capabilities, however, would not be sufficient, for species must 
also exhibit the ability to assert moral states of affairs into public 
existence in a direct, intentional, voluntary and knowledgeable man-
ner. If this requirement is also met, then there would be a strong case 
for ascribing personhood to these species. Differentiation of species is 
important in that only one species is presently known to have the 
capability for freely, intentionally, voluntarily and directly asserting 
higher orders or moral value , order and logic into concrete and public 
existence. 
5. In light of his refusal to offer the protections of the right to life 
to some members of the species homo sapiens, Tooley's offer of such 
protections to some non-members is logically incongruous. While it is 
logically possible for members of other species to acquire the means to 
assert the content of their mental states into existence and actualize 
higher orders of moral value, this should not be considered a practical 
possibility because of the inability of persons to confer on others the 
ontological structures of personhood. It is not at all apparent that it is 
within the capabilities of persons to form the structures which permit 
syntactical and propositional speech, intentional expression and con-
ceptual thought to be actualized in other individuals. And it is not 
apparent that the ontological structures which permit the assertion of 
moral values into public existence can be transferred to other species, 
or actualized by them under their own power. Also, it is not clear that 
the organic, morphological and neurological structures necessary for 
the transformation of private mental states into publicly observable 
states of affairs can be established in other species. In spite of these 
difficulties, Tooley regards it as possibly permissible to ascribe person-
hood and the protections of the right to life to select members of 
other species. Yet some members of the species homo sapiens who 
have both the logical and practical possiblity of asserting their intra-
mental and moral states of affairs into publicly observable existence in 
the proximately present future are denied the protections of this right. 
It is illogical to ascribe the protections of the right to life to individ-
uals who lack the practical possibility of asserting these states into 
public existence while refusing them to individuals who have both the 
logical and practical possibility of actualizing these states. There is also 
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an incongruity involved in the granting of admission into the class of 
persons to individuals who have never expressed in an intentional, 
syntactical and propositional manner the content of their states of 
mind, while refusing this membership to individuals who have this as a 
proximate logical and practical possibility. 
Legal and moral problems are involved in granting personhood to 
non-members of the species homo sapiens. If parrots or porpoises, for 
instance, are to be granted membership in the class of persons on the 
grounds that they have a desire for continued existence, a concept of 
the self as the subject of mental states proper to persons, and the 
belief that they are such a continuing entity, then they must accept 
the duties and obligations that are proper to the class of persons. This 
would mean that dogs would have to refrain from attacking mailmen, 
and that parrots would incur guilt for uttering objectively false state-
ments. There also remains the substantial problem of informing indi-
viduals such as these of their moral, social and civic duties . How these 
problems would be faced is uncertain. 
'Potentiality Principle' 
6. The "potentiality principle" which Tooley claims to be the foun-
dation of the conservative position is not clearly understood by him. 
He argues that the potentiality principle ascribes the right to life to 
the unborn because some trait is possessed potentially that will be-
come actualized in adult life and warrant ascription of the right to 
life. 10 This is not an accurate perception, however, for the properties 
that permit the adult to validly claim the protections of the right to 
life are possessed in their full actuality by the unborn. The right to life 
is validly claimed by the individual of worth who has the capability of 
expressing in an observable form of existence the content of mental 
states which actualize higher orders of meaning, logic, order and moral 
value. In the developing stages of life this capability is found, just as it 
is found in the adult, for the developing stages possess this from the 
moment of genetic coding. 
Tooley's criticism of the potentiality principle rests on a misappre-
hension of the character of the distinctive traits of the person. He 
appears to assume that intentional expression, syntactical and proposi-
tional speech and conceptual thought are actualized in the same way 
that the capability for playing a musical instrument is actualized . The 
capability for performing actions such as playing a musical instrument 
is only actualized after voluntary consent is given. The traits of inten-
tional expression, syntactical and propositional speech and conceptual 
thought do not require voluntary consent for actualization. Persons 
think conceptually by nature without reflection, judgment or consent. 
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This signifies a radical difference between these capabilities and those 
which require voluntary consent. Persons do not voluntarily choose to 
attribute moral value to their human acts, nor do they choose to 
attribute moral evil to acts of murder. The moral quality of their acts 
is inherent to the acts themselves. Failure to see this distinction effec-
tively reduces the properties that distinguish persons to just psycho-
logical properties. The difference between persons and other individ-
uals is an ontological, not just a psychological difference. 
7. It is contended by Tooley that the killing of the unborn is no 
different in its morally relevant characteristics than killing kittens who 
have been injected with a serum that provides them with the potential-
ity of developing into persons.ll He argues this by pointing to the 
fact that there is nothing morally objectionable about refraining from 
injecting the kittens with the serum. This is true. But from that point, 
he asserts that there is nothing objectionable about an action which 
would terminate the process by which these potentialities become 
actualized. This is more difficult to accept. The case which he cites is 
quite unnatural, and we cannot be sure that all of the relevant moral 
factors are known. But if it is the case that the kitten is identical to 
the unborn human person in all relevant moral aspects, then killing the 
kitten would be morally prohibited. If the kitten were an individual of 
inherent worth capable of expressing in a knowledgeable, free, volun-
tary, intentional manner the content of mental states actualizing 
higher orders of meaning, logic, order and moral value, then the kitten 
would have a valid claim to the protections of the right to life. But if 
these properties were not actualized in the kitten, and were only 
possible potentialities, then killing the kitten would not be prohibited. 
For in this condition the kitten is similar to the human egg or sperm 
which does not possess the capability for expressing in a publicly 
observable manner the content of human mental states as an actual-
ized potentiality. The possession of potentialities for existence as a 
person alone is not sufficient for ascription of the protections of the 
right to life. Only when the properties which are proper to persons are 
actual within a materially identifiable individual and are enriching and 
developing is it proper to ascribe the right to life. 
Tooley fails to see that the person is onto logically prior to the 
existence of the desire for life, the awareness of an ego standing in a 
causal relations to mental states and the belief that one is such an ego. 
These conditions cannot constitute a person, for the person must pos-
sess actual existence for the identification and ascription of these 
traits. Without the prior existence of the person, any ascription of 
these traits is incoherent. But if the person is fully actualized, then the 
presence of these traits can aid in the identification and description of 
the person. 
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Doctors 
I stand in awe of Doctors, 
A circle esoteric indeed 
Learnedly diagnostic , prognostic , 
With 'cl inical eye' to lead. 
Vast the store of knowing and doing 
Each scholarly brain to refrain, 
To hold , pigeon-holed for 
the "re nata" now; 
Then to surface instanter again. 
What a marvel, the surgical skills, 
Confounding imagination 
With sections 'ad extra and intra ,' 
To a fraction of millimeters, 
Precise in concatenation. 
Our venturous mind, 
Magnetic to our will, 
May set upon a course to founder. 
And here the good Psychiatrist 
Enters hopefully, with delicate skilL 
A touchy, ad interim foot·note-
Just remuneration due. 
What price my pulsing stream of life? 
Nor gold will purchase the sunshine, 
Nor our life-giving air will renew. 
We, most wondrous of works divine, 
Must meet dread days of detrition , 
Our haven of hope, with the trust of a child, 
This, - the Doctor's glorious mission. 
- Fr. Walter Terence Doyle 
Reprinted with p ermission from Rehab Record, Sept. , 1975, Lawrenceville, N.J. 
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